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14 Media attention to Fortuyn and LPF during the 
2002 elections
Negative bias or following the news routines?
Pytrik Schafraad, Peer Scheepers, and Fred Wester*
The way in which Dutch news media covered the short career of Pim Fortuyn 
and the success and failure of his party LPF has been subject of discussion in 
both public debate and in academic circles. Research on the content of this news 
coverage is scarce and problematic. In this contribution we take the opportunity 
to investigate fourteen weeks of newspaper coverage on Fortuyn to find out in 
what way Dutch newspapers paid attention to Fortuyn. In the analysis we in­
cluded volume, substantial and support attention. With this approach we also 
tried to shed some light on the question of biased news, which was raised in the 
public debate. Our study shows that at first the attention was focussed on the 
xenophobic message and unusual strategy of Fortuyn, but during the campaign 
and after his violent death, attention became more diverse in tone and topic. 
Therefore we conclude that negative bias cannot have been a decisive factor for 
the way newspapers paid attention to Fortuyn. Joining the argument of Hermans
& van den Oever we argue that the dynamics of the newspaper attention rather 
followed the logic of news values such as surprise, magnitude, relevance and fol­
low up.
14.1 Introduction
The unusual campaign and elections for the Dutch parliament in 2002 have had tre­
mendous and lasting consequences. Not only did the political proportions change 
drastically, also greater general acceptance of exclusionist standpoints in politics and in 
public opinion has since become common practise. Last but not least, the relationship 
between politics and news media has changed (see Brants & Van Praag, 2006, p. 38). 
LPF figureheads, amongst others, thought established politicians and media responsible 
for the assassination of Pim Fortuyn.1 True or not true, this critique lead to a process of 
self-reflection ofjournalists and editors.
The assumption that media were biased against Fortuyn and compared him to infam­
ous far-right leaders such as Hans Janmaat and Jorg Haider were at the core of these ac­
cusations against the media. The term ‘demonisation’ became extremely popular as a
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consequence of these statements, leaving the general impression that media reporting on 
Fortuyn had been biased extremely negatively.
Recently, media scholars investigated this question of biased reporting on Fortuyn 
and other contemporary far-right politicians in the Netherlands (Bosman & d’Haenens, 
2008; Scholten & Ruigrok, 2008). Both studies found negative evaluations of far-right 
politicians (in casu Fortuyn and Wilders), however only Bosman and d’Haenens con­
clude that this is due to biased reporting and even demonisation of Fortuyn in one news­
paper (2008, p. 746).
Whereas these scholars focussed on balance in news reporting, a different approach 
starts from whatjournalists normally do. In communication science there is an extensive 
body of literature onjournalist routines and factors of newsworthiness (i.e. Gans, 1980; 
Galtung & Ruge, 1967; Harcup & O’Neil, 2001). From these studies we learned that 
journalist follow strong routines in the way they gather news, decide what is important 
and in the way they present news.
Political news reporting has professionalised over the last few decades and became 
more poll driven and less substantial, however journalist remain adhered to a sense of 
social responsibility (Brants & Van Praag, 2006, p. 38).
In other words there is a certain logic and professional standard behind reporting 
news, including news on political campaigns. The common practise of such professional 
routines makes it rather unlikely that reporting of news about Pim Fortuyn was ex­
tremely biased.
These two perspectives on media-attention to Fortuyn seem to be contradictory. In 
this study, we therefore investigate the media-attention characteristics during fourteen 
weeks of news about Fortuyn and his political party ‘Lijst Pim Fortuyn’ (hereafter LPF) 
and analyse continuities and changes in this coverage. In the analysis we distinguish 
four phases: The party building phase, the campaign phase, the post-murder phase and 
the negotiations phase, which will be explained later on. We take the results of the em­
pirical study of media content to discuss whether the reporting was (extremely) negat­
ive, and if the way of reporting came about due to professional routines, or partisan 
animosity on the part of thejournalists.
14.1.1 The short political career of Pim Fortuyn
The parliamentary elections of May 2002 were very unusual. Never before, was a new 
party elected into parliament with 26 seats, and Dutch society witnessed its first politic­
al murder since World War II (Van Praag, 2003, p. 5). Central to the unusual events was 
former academic, columnist and new politician Pim Fortuyn. Here we sketch the main 
lines of his political career, as it is the setting of our study.
Before the start of his political career, Fortuyn was a columnist for the weekly El­
sevier and wrote several books, of which Tegen de islamisering van onze cultuur 
[Against the Islamisation of our culture] (Fortuyn, 1997) is the most well known. His 
political ideas developed from socialist in the 1980s to liberal in the 1990s and libertari­
an and nationalist by the turn of the century (Pels, 2003; Van Praag, 2003, p. 9). After 
the 9 /11 events, Fortuyn drew a lot of attention with statements like ‘close the borders’ 
and ‘Islam is a backward religion’ (Van Praag, 2003, p. 9). In November 2001 he was 
elected party leader for the populist party Leefbaar Nederland [LN].
190 Schafraad, Scheepers & Wester
To some within LN however, he was too radical. On February 9th 2002, de Volk­
skrant published an interview with Fortuyn, where he proposed to get rid of the anti-dis­
crimination article in the Dutch constitution. The interview soon led to Fortuyn’s 
redundancy as party leader. Meanwhile, Fortuyn was still party leader for the Rotterdam 
local party Leefbaar Rotterdam [LR]. He also directly announced the erection of his 
own party, Lijst Pim Fortuyn [LPF].2 In little more than two months, Fortuyn had to se­
lect suitable people as candidates, set up a party structure and come up with a party pro­
gramme. LPF attracted a lot of political adventurers, of whom some were indeed 
selected as MP candidates and later elected into the Dutch parliament.
In March, Fortuyn’s LR won the local elections in Rotterdam. In the national polls 
he was also booming (Synovate, 2002). In the campaign Fortuyn drew attention with his 
statements, by inviting journalists into his home (Hermans & Van den Oever, chap. 16 
in this volume), and by his debating style in radio and television debates (Van Praag, 
2003, p. 13). In the debates he distinguished himself by his directness against liberal 
leader Dijkstal and social democrat leader Melkert, but also by walking away when con­
fronted with critical replies of green-left leader Rosemuller. Instead of a party pro­
gramme, Fortuyn published a book about the mess that, in his opinion, the governing 
parties created in the past eight years (Fortuyn, 2002).
In the midst of the heat of this campaign, Fortuyn was assassinated by an environ­
mental activist on May 6th, nine days before election day. After this national crisis, the 
election campaign was officially stopped. Despite Fortuyn’s violent death, LPF entered 
parliament with 26 seats (17% of the votes). The party took part in the negotiations for a 
new coalition government, and eventually became part of the first government led by 
Christian-democratic Prime Minister Balkenende.
14.1.2 Bias towards Fortuyn and other far-right politicians
In the literature, as well as in public debate, the question to which political family For­
tuyn (and the LPF) belonged, has been asked (Pels, 2003; Ignazi, 2006). Others rather 
assume Fortuyn did not really belong to the far-right (Bosman & d’Haenens, 2008). 
Here we follow both Ignazi (2006, p. 32) and Fennema (2005), who argue that the far- 
right is a heterogeneous group of parties. Both distinguish between traditional or ex­
treme far-right parties and contemporary (racist or populist) far-right parties. Whereas 
the Dutch party Centrumdemocraten had characteristics of both the traditional and racist 
far-right, the LPF can be characterised mainly as populist far-right (Ignazi, 2006).
Research on media-attention to the far-right showed that media applied a media-im­
age of controversial outsiders to describe the far-right, whereby especially in the 
eighties and early nineties the emphasis was on the controversial characteristics of the 
far-right and an increase of more diverse and nuanced media-attention started in the 
second half of the nineties. This change continued stronger, when Fortuyn entered the 
political arena, although the controversial outsider image remained dominant 
(Schafraad, Wester & Scheepers, 2009). Others concentrated on the balance between 
negative and positive tone in media coverage of the far-right. Scholten et al. found that 
others (politicians, commentators and the like) mostly reacted negatively to far-right 
politician Wilders in the news (2009). Newspaper attention to Fortuyn contained a lot of 
framing, which is automatically viewed as negative bias by Bosman and d’Haenens 
(2008).
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All these studies support Hallin and Mancini's statement that although political jour­
nalism has professionalised and media are no longer connected to political parties, this 
does not mean that political news has become neutral (2004, p. 180). Others found that 
news media are rather centrifugal, as they mostly adhere to dominant powers and criti­
cise outsiders, which Fortuyn was until his death (Gitlin, 1980; Krouwel, 2008). Fol­
lowing this line of arguments, critical reporting or even biased reporting towards the 
LPF can thus be expected.
14.1.3 Professional routines
Negative news does not automatically mean that journalists are biased against Fortuyn. 
News production is news selection in the first place, which happens according to a 
standardised set of criteria. Contemporary selection criteria, relevant in this context, are: 
surprise, bad news, magnitude, relevance and follow-up (Harcup & O'Neil, 2001, p. 
278-279). These criteria were found in recent research on news construction, as reported 
elsewhere in this volume, as well (Hermans & Van den Oever, chap. 16).
Not only news selection is subject to standardisation, also the rest of news produc­
tion is highly routinised (Gitlin, 1980; Tuchman, 1978). In the process of professional­
isation that news production has gone through in recent decades, news has become 
subject to specific quality standards (Brants & Van Praag, 2006; Buijs, 2008). Profes­
sional journalist quality standards are: factuality, balance, neutral presentation, com­
pleteness and relevance (Westersthal, 1983; Brants & Van Praag, 2006; Buijs, 2008; see 
also Hermans & Van den Oever, chap. 16). The latter authors also found that, although 
journalist may have their private political preferences, they adhere to these professional 
quality standards in their reporting on Fortuyn. Critical investigation and reporting thus 
may not be mistaken for biased reporting.
From this body of literature it can be expected that media attention to Fortuyn was 
subject to news routines based on the mentioned news values, instead of onjournalists' 
political sentiments. In the case media attention would depend on political preferences 
of journalists and these would be against Fortuyn, media attention would constantly or 
increasingly be focussed on ‘negative aspects’ of his standpoints and campaign strategy. 
However we expect the news on Fortuyn to be the product of news values as argued 
above. Drawing from Harcup and O'Neil (2001) and Hermans and Van den Oever (chap. 
16) we see five especially influencial news values here. These news values are ‘bad 
news’ (stories on conflict and tragedy), ‘surprise’ (stories that have elements of con­
trast / surprise), ‘magnitude’ (potential impact) and ‘relevance’ (perceived as relevant by 
the public) and, due to the political process (elections), also to ‘follow up’ (Harcup & 
O'Neil, 2001, p. 279). If these news values are indeed decisive, we may expect the me­
dia attention to Fortuyn to change from phase to phase, as specific events in each phase 
trigger the news values differently.
14.1.4 Hypotheses
Just before the first research phase, Fortuyn made his controversial, and in many 
people's view, xenophobic statements and the erection of LPF was a direct consequence 
of this. Bad news and surprise were dominant news values here. Attention would be on 
the xenophobic statements and the surprise move of LN leadership and that of Fortuyn.
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Hypothesis 1: In the ‘party building’ phase the content of most media-attention was 
unfavourable for Fortuyn.
Due to Fortuyn’s increasing popularity and the uniqueness of his booming career and 
polls, relevance and surprise became more important news selection criteria and news­
papers focused more on these unique successes in their reporting. Meanwhile the con­
troversially (bad news) remained a highly relevant criterion and thus attention to 
xenophobic statements and other ‘bad news’ was still on a significantly high level. This 
leads to hypothesis two.
Hypothesis 2: During the campaign, the content of most media-attention became sig­
nificantly more favourable for Fortuyn.
Fortuyn’s sudden death turned all routines upside down, even more so due to the heavy 
critique on the role of the media (see Hermans & Van den Oever, chap. 16). Therefore 
we expect unfavourable news about Fortuyn to be completely absent from the news in 
the first weeks after his death, when he also posthumously won the national elections 
(surprise, magnitude).
Hypothesis 3: In the post-murder weeks, media-attention is completely favourable to 
Fortuyn.
As Fortuyn himself was slowly replaced in the headlines by his LPF successors who en­
gaged in negotiations for a new government and internal affairs in the party follow an­
other quickly, these issues become central to the media-attention again, as the routines 
regain their traditional place after the shock of Fortuyn’s death and posthumous electoral 
victory fade out. In other words, surprise (bad news) combined with magnitude became 
the most important news selection criteria.
Hypothesis 4: In the negotiations phase, bad news and magnitude selection criteria 
cause a strong increase of unfavourable emphasis in the news and a decrease of fa­
vourable emphasis.
14.2 Research design
In the context of the PhD project of the first author, we gathered content analysis data 
on media-attention to Fortuyn and the LPF in 14 weeks around the 2002 parliamentary 
elections form three Dutch newspapers. The data stretch out from early March to one 
month after the elections, held on May 15th, 2002. We distinguish four phases within 
these three months. Weeks 1 to 5 are the ‘party building phase’, when Fortuyn was es­
tablishing his new party LPF. Weeks 6 to 8 are the ‘campaign phase’. The elections 
were held only in week 10, but the campaign was stopped after the assassination of For­
tuyn on May 6th. The third phase contains the reactions and events directly following 
the assassination, as well as Fortuyn’s posthumous electoral victory, this is the ‘post­
murder phase’. In the last three weeks, coverage of the aftermath of both key events re­
treats to the background and is replaced by news on the formation of a new coalition
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government, which eventually ended in a government including the LPF; the ‘negoti­
ations phase’.
We selected all news and background articles from three daily newspapers in 
the Dutch media landscape (N = 802). From this selection we drew a random sample of 
337 news articles, proportionally divided over the three news papers: NRCHandelsblad 
(n = 122), De Telegraaf (n = 79) and de Volkskrant (n = 136), which we used for the 
content analysis.
In order to get a grip on the way Fortuyn and other prominent LPF members fea­
tured in the news, we analysed 5 aspects of media attention. First, the volume of atten­
tion measured in the number of news articles that covered them per week.
Then three dimensions of what we labelled substantial attention (Schafraad et al., 
2008, 2009). The first of these is representation. This indicator measures whether For­
tuyn was only written about (passive representation), or paraphrased or cited (active 
representation). In this way we get an indication of the interest of news media for For­
tuyn. Also, this indicator provides a direct answer to the question, if Fortuyn was ig­
nored by journalists, which is another acusation to the press stemming from the far-right 
(Fennema & Van der Brug, 2006). Then, we looked at the headlines and distinguished 
between headlines favourable to Fortuyn (e.g., “Pirn stijf op kop in opiniepeilingen” 
[Pim leading the polls], De Telegraaf, March 16, 2002) and those unfavourable to For­
tuyn (e.g., “Lijst LPF: haastklus met grote problemen” [List LPF: hasty job with major 
problems], de Volkskrant, April 25, 2002). A third indicator of substantial attention that 
we used is presence of stigmatising associations in the article. These include associ­
ations with the Nazis, or extremist violent groups, such as neo-Nazis, or skinheads. 
Presence of such associations contributes to a negative image of Fortuyn and may func­
tion as disqualifiers in electoral competition (Schafraad et al., 2008, p. 365, Van Donse- 
laar & Rodrigues, 2003, p. 63).
The fifth and last aspect of media-attention that we analysed is support attention. 
More specific, we looked at the presence of attitudes towards Fortuyn or other actors, 
such as politicians, civilians, government officials etc. These were also categorised as 
favourable towards Fortuyn and unfavourable towards Fortuyn.
Thus, in contrast to previous research on media-attention to Fortuyn (Bosman & 
d’Haenens, 2009), we analysed multiple aspects (volume, substantial and support atten­
tion) of this media-attention, and allowed for pro- and contra-Fortuyn bias.
14.3 Results
14.3.1 Volume attention
Figure 14.1 shows that in the weeks before the actual election campaign started, 20 to 
30 articles about Fortuyn featured per week in three newspapers together. The only ex­
ception is the week when Fortuyn’s book, that sort of replaced the non-existent LPF 
party programme, was released (Fortuyn, 2002). In that week almost 70 articles, often 
with collected comments on and analyses of Fortuyn’s book, appeared. Every week fur­
ther into the election campaign shows increased electoral support and produced more 
news on Fortuyn, as expected, but the highest peaks in the news were in the two weeks 
following his assassination. Not included in these figures are the opinion pages in the 
newspapers that were filled with commentary and dozens of reader’s letters, as we found
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Figure 14.1 Volume attention and Polls
out during the collection of the newspaper articles for the content analysis. This flood of 
news input and commentary dried out after two weeks, when the amount of news 
dropped back to proportions of the same size as before the elections. From the second 
week of the ‘negotiations phase’ on, the volume of attention started increasing again.
14.3.2 Representation
One relevant aspect of substantial attention here is whether Fortuyn is represented in a 
passive (just mentioned) or active (paraphrased or cited) fashion (see Figure 14.2). A 
low level of active representation suggests a greater distance between journalist (and 
reader) on the one hand and the subject on the other. The latter is ‘not involved’ but only 
‘talked about’ in the case of passive representation.
Exactly 50% of all articles contains active representation of Fortuyn. In week 12 and 
14 even up to 79 and 73%, while in week 3 (‘party building phase’) and 6 (start of 
‘campaign phase’), Fortuyn is mostly written about, without being a source himself 
(33% active representation).
In the ‘party building phase, Fortuyn was actively represented in about 40 to 50% of 
the coverage. In the campaign phase, active representation increased steadily from 33 to 
52%. In the election week, LPF is more often written about, without being an active 
source itself, however during the ‘post-murder phase’, active representation increased 
further to 58%. In the ‘negotiations phase active representation is at its highest level, 
between 60-80% of the coverage.
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Figure 14.2 Representation of Fortuyn and LPF in the coverage per week (N = 337)
14.3.3 Headline tone
While the previous indicators of media attention give us information about in what way 
Fortuyn received attention, the following figures provide us with information about the 
balance between favourable and unfavourable messages about Fortuyn in the coverage.
As a first measure we coded whether the headline of each article contains the name 
of Fortuyn, the LPF or other main characters from within the LPF (chairman, candid­
ates, financers). 43% of all headlines contained one of these key words, or names. 
Secondly we coded whether these headlines were favourable or unfavourable for For­
tuyn. When the tone of the headline was neutral, or not clearly leaning one way or the 
other it was coded as neutral. Figure 14.3 only shows the percentages of favourable or 
unfavourable headlines.
Interestingly, the majority of headlines did not include indicators of a favourable or 
unfavourable tone towards Fortuyn. In the ‘party building phase’ most of these head­
lines were unfavourable, but fluctuate between none to 33% of all headlines. Favourable 
headlines varied between absent and 25% per week. On average, 17% of all headlines in 
this phase was unfavourable and 9% favourable. In the ‘campaign phase’ the emphasis 
was the opposite, 14% favourable to 9% unfavourable. In the ‘post-murder phase’, fa­
vourable headlines increased suddenly up to 43% (average of ‘post-murder phase’ 
22%), while unfavourable headlines became relatively seldom with 3-7% of the head­
lines each week. Finally, in the ‘negotiation phase’ outspoken headlines disappeared 
from most articles. About 5% was still unfavourable, while none were favourable.
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14.3.4 Stigmatising associations
The indicator ‘presence of stigmatising associations’ was created to measure to what ex­
tend newspapers use symbolically loaded references and terms to label far-right actors 
(see Figure 14.4). This measure includes reporting on such use by others, which turned 
out to be especially relevant in the case of Fortuyn. The majority of such references in 
the articles on Fortuyn reported on use of these terms, instead of journalists' use of them 
to label Fortuyn.
In 10% of all Fortuyn coverage we found stigmatising association, which is com­
pared to coverage of other far-right parties, not much (Schafraad et al., 2008, 2009). 
About 7% of the coverage of Fortuyn in the ‘party building phase’ included stigmatising 
associations. In the ‘campaign phase’, these disappeared completely, except in the week 
(7) of the debate with social democrat leader Melkert, when comparing Fortuyn with the 
Nazis and reactions to these statements became a media hype (Vasterman, 2004). The
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Figure 14.4 Presence of stigmatising associations in the coverage per week (N =  337)
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‘post murder phase’ shows a steady presence of stigmatising associations of about 12%. 
Further investigation showed that this is not so strange, as most of these were old stig­
matising associations, recalled by the successors of Fortuyn, such as LPF chairman Lan- 
gendam and party leader Herben. A real, but much smaller increase from 0 to 8% in the 
last week of the ‘negotiations week’ suggests that outsiders still saw resemblances 
between LPF and traditional far-right parties and figureheads.
14.3.5 Support attention
For support attention, we looked at the share of the coverage that included either favour­
able or unfavourable attitudes of non-far-right actors, such as competing politicians, 
government officials, or civil society actors (see Figure 14.5).
In 17% of all coverage we found favourable attitudes of non-far-right actors and about 
40% contained unfavourable attitudes. This is a negative balance, one could say, but 
compared to other far-right parties it is not (Schafraad et al., 2008, 2009). Throughout 
the research phase we also found a development of an increasing emphasis on favour­
able attitudes (from 5% average in the ‘party building phase’ to 29% in the ‘negotiation 
phase’), while unfavourable attitudes remained dominant, but decreased significantly 
anyway (from 50% to 43%). The increase of attention for favourable attitudes is stable 
and steady. However, the decrease of attention to unfavourable attitudes is strongest in 
the ‘post-murder phase’, and returns to the level of the ‘campaign phase’, in the last 
couple of weeks. In three weeks there is a balance in the attention to favourable and un­
favourable attitudes, week 9 (directly after the assassination), week 11 and week 14.
14.4 Conclusion and discussion
In this study we critically investigated news reporting on Fortuyn, just before and dur­
ing the campaign, as well as directly after his assassination and in the first weeks of the 
negotiations for the formation of a new government coalition, in which Fortuyn's suc­
cessors took part. A widely shared belief states that the dominant tone in the media was
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extremely biased against Fortuyn. This statement found support of some communication 
scientists as well (i.e. Bosman & d’Haenens, 2008). An extensive body of literature ar­
gues thatjournalists are professionals, who follow specific news values, which makes it 
unlikely that they show their private opinions in their news reporting (Gans, 1980; Har- 
cup & O’Neil, 2001). Elsewhere in this volume, Hermans and Van den Oever (chap. 16) 
found confirmation for this theory in their study ofjournalist practices during Fortuyn’s 
political career. Looking at the content of newspaper reporting, we drew four hypo­
theses from this latter argument, each concentrating on one phase in the political career 
of Fortuyn. In this way we tried to answer our research question: how did media-atten­
tion to Fortuyn change during the fourteen weeks between the erection o f Fortuyn's 
LPF and the start o f negotiations fo r  a new government after the elections in 2002?
Hypothesis 1 expected most media-attention in the ‘party building’ phase to be unfa­
vourable to Fortuyn. The content analysis found nothing but support for this thesis. 
When Fortuyn featured in the news, he was mostly passively represented, twice as much 
headlines were unfavourable than favourable, almost all support attention in this phase 
was unfavourable to Fortuyn.
For the ‘campaign phase’, hypothesis 2 expected a more favourable media-attention 
to Fortuyn. In this second phase the analysis shows a change in the media-attention. 
Active representation no longer went up and down every week, but steadily rose; the 
share of favourable headlines increased every week, while that of unfavourable head­
lines is significantly lower than in the first phase and stigmatising associations were ab­
sent (except in the reporting on the debate that caused the media hype) (see above). 
Support attention was still dominantly unfavourable, but favourable attitudes appeared 
increasingly in the coverage, while unfavourable ones decreased. All in all, this supports 
our second hypothesis.
In the ‘post-murder phase’ that included election day and thus the posthumous vic­
tory of Fortuyn, hypothesis 3 expected completely favourable media-attention to For­
tuyn. The results show a mixed picture, at first sight. Active representation and 
favourable headlines and mentioning of favourable attitudes of non-far-right actors in­
creased sharply, as expected. However, stigmatising associations and unfavourable atti­
tudes of non-far-right actors are still present, instead of disappearing. However, a deeper 
analysis of the material revealed that the majority of these stigmatising associations and 
unfavourable attitudes were in quotes of Fortuyn supporters and LPF leaders accusing 
the opposition and media of negative stereotyping of Fortuyn. The ‘real’ amount of stig­
matising associations and unfavourable attitudes of non-far-right actors is therefore sig­
nificantly lower than in the previous phases. Media attention for Fortuyn is thus not 
completely favourable to Fortuyn, but the share of unfavourable media attention is at a 
very low level, therefore we conclude that hypothesis 3 is largely confirmed.
Finally, hypothesis 4 expected a rise in unfavourable news in the ‘negotiation phase’ 
that followed. Favourable aspects of media attention decreased from the fourth week 
after the murder, while unfavourable ones increased from that same moment. The only 
exception is active representation that continued to increase, which can be explained by 
the shift of the attention to commentary of the (LPF) participants in the negotiations for 
a new coalition government. Hence hypothesis 4 is confirmed.
The general development in the media attention to Fortuyn largely followed the ex­
pectation, as we formulated them. Except for the third phase which is of course domin­
ated by the news of Fortuyn’s death, it also follows the media lifecycle of populist right
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parties, as formulated by Steward et al. (2003). As Fortuyn had serious similarities with 
other far-right parties and because his unconventional strategy he received mainly unfa­
vourable media attention in the first phase. In the second phase this unfavourable media 
attention continued, but was supplemented with favourable media attention, as he did 
well in the polls. The murder and electoral victory led to a lot of praise in the media in 
the third phase, followed by increasing critique and unfavourable media attention when 
this media hype was over and Fortuyn’s successors entered the negotiations for a new 
coalition government.
These developments confirm the expectations that we drew from communication 
science theories about news values. As we see a changing dynamic in the media atten­
tion, we conclude that journalists followed professional routines and news values in 
their work, instead of following political antipathies. If the latter was the case, we would 
have seen media attention continuously dominated by unfavourable emphasis and tone. 
During the campaign, the uniqueness and expected impact of Fortuyn’s participation in 
the elections drew increasingly more attention. His successes and the support for For­
tuyn were not ignored at all. This conclusion finds supplemental support in the compar­
ison with media-attention to other far-right parties. Favourable aspects received more 
attention, while unfavourable aspects received less attention and were less crude than 
news on previous Dutch far-right parties (see Schafraad et al., 2009).
This means that in news institutions with high levels of professionalism, like the 
Dutch newspapers, news selection criteria also determine the content of the news for a 
large part. Unfavourable news content is a consequence of unfavourable, or negative 
events, in terms of unconventional behaviour of Fortuyn, or in terms of citations of him­
self, followers, or opposition. Therefore we must conclude that there was no demonisa- 
tion, or extreme bias in the news on Fortuyn in Dutch newspapers in the weeks before 
and after the 2002 parliamentary elections.
Notes
1 For example by LPF chairman Langendam in an interview with Parool and by 
Parool editor Sinnema in the weekly HP / De Tijd.
2 For reasons of convenience we speak of Fortuyn when we in fact mean Fortuyn’s 
local party Leefbaar Rotterdam (LR), his national party Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), or 
other main figures within these parties.
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